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Bridging the Gap: 
International Organizations as Organizations 
INTRODUCTION 
The gap between the study of international organizations and the 
sociology of organizations is deep and persistent. Political science 
has witnessed a considerable development in the study of international 
organizations as a part of international relations or global politics. 
Sociology and psychology have been the scene of equally impressive 
developments in the study of modern organizations. What is curious here 
is the almost complete ignorance each set of studies has of the other. 
The ignorance in political science is slightly less than in sociology 
and psychology, where it seems almost complete. 
At least since Weber's great studies, sociologists have been inter- 
ested in the rise and spread of the modern bureaucratic form of 
organization. Merton, Presthaus, Selznick, Lipset, Bendix, and Coleman 
are only a few of the many who have followed Weber to produce sig- 
nificant insights into the origins and implications of this new form of 
organization. Yet to learn of the equally momentous rise of inter- 
national organizations, or those that deliberately span state boun- 
daries, one must turn to political science. A host of functionalists 
have described the rise of these organizations, usually looking hope- 
fully for signs of a more integrated and peaceful world (Mitrany 1933 
and 1966, Luard 1966 and 1977, Hill 1978, and Jacobson 1984). The Union 
of International Associations was founded as early as 1907 and for some 
years has published a Yearbook of International Organizations, with 
entries that number in the thousands. Wallace and Singer (1970) have 
advanced systematic analysis in this field considerably by identifying 
all international governmental organizations and their memberships since 
1815. 
Sociologists have scarcely noted that they exist. In his rich com- 
pilation of facts and theories on Organizations a Environments (1979), 
Howard Aldrich makes no mention of the United Nations, Multinational 
Corporations, or the myriad private associations and foundations that 
work in the specifically international environment. Nor does Scott 
(1987) deal with these organizations in one of the best recent texts in 
organizational sociology. The new world systems perspective has led to 
extensive concern with multinational corporations, but this is not a 
concern with organizations per se, as that concern has been with the 
internationalization of production. 
There have been a few deliberate attempts to use insights from 
organizational sociology in the study of international organizations. 
Haas (1964) drew on concepts from Weberian bureaucracy, human relations, 
and systems theories in sociology, but found these less than applicable, 
in large part, we believe, because he was focusing on what has been the 
dominant questions in international organizations: how can they create 
a more integrated world cormnunity?l Cox (1969) has drawn on Selznick's 
leadership work to produce some good insights into decision-making in 
international organizations. More recently Crane and Finkle (1981) and 
Ascher (1983) have drawn, respectively, on Selznick and Thompson, and 
March and Simon, and to a lesser extent Crozier, to understand distinc- 
tive conditions in the World Bank. The most recent work is that of 
Jonsson (1986), who bemoans the gap as we do. He follows Gordenker and 
Sanders suggestion and draws on work in interorganizational relations to 
provide a systematic and testable theory of linking-pin organizations. 
We shall return to some of these examples below. Here we merely wish to 
make the point that some political scientists have indeed drawn on at 
least limited segments of organizational sociology to examine inter- 
national organizations. We can find no specific cases of the 
reverse. (They may indeed exist, of course, but they are certainly not 
prominent in the literature.) 
The reasons for the ignorance are not easy to identify. Gordenker 
and Sanders (1978) have suggested that political scientists in the field 
ignore the work of sociologists because the latter have dealt primarily 
with business firms and governments, which they argue do not provide 
applicable models for international organizations. It is difficult to 
. At the same time, Haas did draw on the more developed 
organizational insights of sociology, and in part because of this was 
led to develop a revision of functionalism that was less politically 
naive than Mitrany's classical functionalism. . We shall argue below that 
this classical version operates with what is essentially a naive view 
of organizations as simple mechanical tools. 
accept that judgement in the face of extensive studies of all manner of 
organizations. One need only scan the list of studies listed in the 
references of any recent textbook on organizations to see the great 
variety of organizations that have been subject to systematic analysis. 
Many of these could provide research leads in international organiza- 
tions. For example, in examinin9 the dynamics of creating a regional, 
cross-state, planning and operating organization, Selznick's TVA study 
might have raised questions about cooptation, commitment, and goal nar- 
rowing in many United Nations development agencies. Like these, the TVA 
had to deal with local sovereignties, weak overall legal power, and 
limited fiscal and legal a~tonomy.~ But this potential lead was not 
followed. Thus something other than an exclusive focus on government or 
business must explain why political scientists have not found 
organizational sociology useful for their analyses. There have yet been 
no attempts to explain why sociologists have so totally ignored inter- 
national organizations. We suspect the reasons on both sides lie in 
more the organizational conditions that reflect the invisible colleges 
of the modern intellectual professions. Organizational sociologists, 
and for that matter psychologists have long been concerned with issues 
of organizational performance.* Political science, especially in 
international relations has been far more concerned with issues of 
. It is true, however, that the largest volume of work is in the 
area "Human Relations" school work on factories and firms (Perrow, 
1986). 
'. We do not wish to imply a strict parallel between sovereignty 
of the states in the US and Nation State members of the United Nations. 
The Federal government in the US has far greater central power than does 
the UN, especially in taxation and legal prerogatives. Nonetheless, 
sovereignty, as we shall argue below, is a variable rather than a 
dichotomous attribute, and the American states in the early 1930s had a 
considerable amount of autonomy, if not full sovereignty, in decision- 
making. And it was precisely in dealing with this local autonomy that 
Selznick found an explanation for some of the TVA's most important 
characteristics. Further, like the UN, the TVA is in many respects what 
Jacobson calls a meta-bureaucracy, an organization that deals not with 
individual clients but with organizational members. 
This emphasis on organizational performance may explain why 
there seems to be so much more cross-fertilization in organizational 
studies between sociology, public administration, business, and psychol- 
ogy than between any of these and international organizations. 
national power, especially as it is used for and against other nations 
states. This "realist" position seems to imply that such organizations 
are creatures of the state, and thus are not of great interest in them- 
selves. 
Whatever the reason for the gap, it can only be regretted. 'In 
general, ignorance in any form in the social sciences is something that 
cannot be accepted for long. More specifically, each side of the gap 
would stand to grow through more effective bridging efforts. Gordenker 
and Sanders have suggested that a more abstract body of theory would be 
most welcome. in international organizations, because it has been marked 
by much normative and teleological thinking. In effect, more abstract 
organizational theory might help to make the study of International 
Organizations more objective and scientific. For sociology, an examina- 
tion of international organizations would add greatly to our understand- 
ing of how environments and organizations interact and shape each other, 
and how the patterns of interaction affect such things as internal 
organizational processes, or organizational outcomes. Further, in 
attempting to link together international governmental organizations, 
(IGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), and multi- 
national corporations (or business international nongovernmental 
organizations, BINGOS) in a single theoretical framework, we might be 
forced to develop a more effective taxonomy of environments, which would 
advance greatly our general understanding of what they are. At a more 
micro level, we could raise questions about the relation between culture 
and organization, and about the relative capacity of each to affect 
behavior in organizations that must deal in multinational situations or 
with multinational staffs. There is interesting work going on in this 
field in management and businesss, but it has as yet had only limited 
impact on organizational sociology, and it does not appear to have been 
used to examine the new and burgeoning UN's international civil service. 
S. Laurent (1983) and Hofstede (1983) represent a large and 
rapidly growing body of business literature that provides good insights 
for organizational sociology. Much of this appears in the journal, 
International Studies $J Management Organization There is also much 
interesting work coming out of the experience of multinational corpora- 
tions, appearing in the Journal -- of of International Business, see for 
example Doz and Prahalad (1984) and Egelhoff (1984). 
Here we wish to take some steps to bridge the gap, largely by iden- 
tifying areas from organizational sociology that can be usefully applied 
to the study of international organizations. Our hope.is that this will 
as well provide a feedback to the sociology of organizations.' We 
argue that a critical source of the lacunae between the two fields 
derives from their difference in the concern for the issue of 
organizational performance, which we trace to the early formulations of 
Functionalism. To make this case, we examine the Functionalist orienta- 
tions in Sociology and International Relations. From this we select two 
major concepts from organizational sociology -- environments and tech- 
nology -- which have emerged as critical correlates of performance. 
Finally, we deal with organizational goals and structures, two concepts 
that are central to organizational analysis, but less central to the 
issue of performance. In the conclusion we suggest greater attention to 
issues of performance in international organizations, and suggest 
propositions and a general strategy for testing the propositions. 
RELATED CONCEPTS : FUNCTIONALISM, REGIMES, ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
The Two Functionalisms: I0 and Sociological --
Although Weiss (1975) sees roots in Henri Saint Simon, David 
Mitrany is generally accepted as the father of functional theory in 
international organizations (Jacobson 1984). From his earlier writings 
during the second world war, through his latest, he proposed a normative 
aim and a teleological process. for international organizations. The aim 
was to be peace, through an integrated world community that could make 
war unnecessary, impractical, or impossible. The aim was also to be 
welfare, patterned on the development of the modern welfare state. For 
this, international organizations should focus their attention on tech- 
nically specialized functions, especially in providing welfare for 
individuals and groups. The focus on specific functions would bring 
into play technical rather than political considerations, which would be 
less conflictual because they could be solved by rational calculation. 
. In fact in this essay we shall deal primarily with the utility 
of sociological perspectives for the study of international organiza- 
tions, leaving for another essay a deeper concern with the utility of 
international organizations for the sociology of organizations. 
The result will be enhanced welfare and a more integrated world com- 
muni ty . 
These functionally-specific organizations would lead to greater 
world integration through two processes. Involvement in these organiza- 
tions would produce both cognitive and value changes. People 
(presumably both elites and a sufficient proportion of the population to 
provide a social base for elites) will come to see the real complexity 
of the international scene and will not be swayed by simple-minded solu- 
tions to.the problems. Further, the value change implies an erosion of 
the more limited national loyalties that are brought into play in war, 
and in some sense are assumed to be a basis for war. Second, involve- 
ment in the international organizations would increase the interests of 
participants in their continuation. It would "enmesh" them in benefi- 
cial exchanges and thus raise the costs of breaking the exchange through 
the declaration of war. 
-. - . .  - 
~l though' the vision of f unctionalismAasheen very much elaborated, 
and revised in neo-functional models, the basic paradigm remains alive 
and well in the literature. The aim is world peace and human welfare, 
and international organizations can help produce this through building a 
more integrated world community. The causal connections in this process 
also remain much the same: enmeshment and cognitive/value change. 
Though his political work creating the European coal and steel community 
stimulated a neo-functionalist revision in the works of Haas, Schuman 
expressed the basic functionalist "enmeshment" argument clearly when he 
proclaimed that the newly created community would make future wars 
between France and Germany "...not merely unthinkable, but impos- 
sible." (Harrison, 1978) 
In one of the most comprehensive and coherent recent analyses of 
the network of international organizations, Jacobson (1984) presents a 
more cautious and guarded vision, but the hope and the theorized 
mechanisms remain the same. For example, Jacobson reanalysed Wallace 
and Singer's (1970) data and found a more hopeful sign than they had 
found that international organizations were indeed working to protect 
the integrity of states and to avoid violent conflicts (p 1961.' There 
has also been global economic development, in part attributable to the 
international government organizations. This in turn leads to greater 
welfare, and enmeshment through economic exchanges. Jacobson also cites 
Inkeles, who argues that these changes would surely produce a greater 
homogeneity of values and attitudes in the world, with the implication 
that this, too, leads to increased integration and a reduction of the 
chance of war.8 
Although international organization (10) political scientists are 
quick to point out that their functionalism is not the same thing as the 
sociologists' functionalism, there are important similarities. The I0 
enmeshment idea finds a parallel in Durkheim's view that modern, 
organic, solidarity arises through functional interdependence, though 
Durkheim did not draw the same conclusions about conflict and harmony. 
The I0 teleology finds a parallel in Parsons' formulations, portraying 
modern industrial-capitalist, market-oriented, pluralist democratic 
society as a state toward which all social forms were converging. The 
importance I0 functionalism attache's to value change and international 
loyalty as a source of peace finds its parallel in the sociological 
functionalist view of normative integration as the ultimate source of 
. He also cites Haas, however, who argued that the "inter- 
national regime" may have suffered some disintegration since 1965. 
Functionalists theories have not been subjected to as much 
testing as they might have been, although some tests have been made. 
Jacobson (1986) presents another with positive results, but the logic of 
the causal connections continues to cause some trouble. For example, 
the connection between group loyalty, integration, and conflict has not 
been spelled out and tested in functionalist theory, though substantial 
evidence exists to question the assumed causal direction. The Com- 
munists were not the only ones to be disillusioned when German and 
French proletarian brothers took to the trenches in 1914 to slaughter 
one another in massive numbers. Many Third World pan-ethnic nationalist 
movements fractured along ethnic lines after independence was won. We 
see only one of the more tragic cases of this problem in Sri Lanka 
today. One of the assumptions that must surely be questioned is the 
stability of group loyalties, and the speed with which they can change. 
Japanese Americans in Hawaii produced a massive switch of allegiance 
after December 7, 1941. Perhaps the most extreme case of the 
instability of group identities and loyalty, however, is found in Nazi 
Germany. Germans Jews were by most accounts among the most integrated 
of all European Jews, but that did not prevent the holocaust. 
social solidarity. And, of course, both functionalist perspectives 
focus much attention on actual behavior patterns, as opposed to con- 
stitutions or purely legal prescriptions. This represented a substan- 
tial advance in the thinking of international organizations (Taylor 
1978), though it may be seen to have a longer heritage and to represent 
less discontinuity in sociology. 
Although there are some similarities in the two functionalisms, the 
impact on their respective organizational analyses has been radically 
different. Gordenker and Sanders see a persistent normative and 
teleological orientation the internationalists functionalism. Organiza- 
tions are the tools that will lead to greater peace and prosperity. 
Sociological functionalism9 has produced a more skeptical, even cyni- 
cal, view of organizations, giving the field something of an "expose" 
character.10 Organizational sociology begins with a Weberian view of 
organizations as rational collectivities with limited goals, and an 
orientation to action. They also involve power. People and groups 
create organization to produce something that they can themselves con- 
trol. The production requires the imperative specification and coor- 
dination of tasks, involving hierarchy, specialization, and authority 
and responsibility based on rational calculation and technical expert- 
ise. For Weber, and for the followers as well, this "impersonal and 
rational" bureaucratic form of organization is the most powerful form 
the world has ever seen. To this point, there is probably little dis- 
9. Functionalism in sociology, of course, has undergone a con- 
siderable transformation. The authors listed here can be considered 
functionalists because of their training under Merton and Parsons, but 
as Gouldner (1970) and others have noted, this brand of functionalism 
has evolved into many different, and sometimes antagonistic strains. 
They approach a conflict perspective, but were not by any means fully 
articulated as such. The specifically conflict perspective in 
organizational analysis has been quite weak, developed only in a few 
works: Benson (1977), Goldman & Van Houten (19771, and Clawson (1980). 
Westhues (1976) has argued that organizational and class perspectives 
are really different "paradigms" in the social sciences, which move in 
quite-different directions and do not really confront one another. 
lo. The term is Perrow's (1986, p 1571, and the perspective draws 
heavily on the insights of Selznick, which are summarized effectively in 
that volume. We also draw heavily on Selznick in the discussion that 
follows . 
agreement between the two functionalisms, though the international type 
has not specified organizational conditions to this degree. 
In the sociological view, however, the organization is not a simple 
mechanical tool. It interacts with an environment, and contains members 
who seek to use the organization for their own ends, often struggling 
with others over both the content and-the allocation of the product. 
The outcome of these dynamics produces a distinctive character as 
organizations move through time. They usually.develop a commitment to a 
specific technology, for example, and most important, they come to be 
infused with value. For Selznick this amounted to the institutionaliza- 
tion of organizations. .They are, in effect, transformed from simple 
tools of their creators into collectivities that are at least partly 
ends in themselves. Organizations are tools, to be sure, but in 
Selznick's classic phrase, they are recalcitrant tools of action. His- 
tories, environmental interactions, and internal conflicts give them a 
specific set of constraints. They also give organizations a specific 
set of powers, but these are not always the powers their creators 
intended. If functionalism in international organizations has sought to 
show how the rise of these organizations will serve altruistic ends by 
producing a more enmeshed and value homogeneous international community, 
in the sociological analysis, it has sought to show how organizations 
often serve narrow interests, of either creators or other members, 
behind masks of altruistic public interest. 
From this sociological perspective, I0 functional analysis must be 
seen as operating with an essentially simple and mechanical view of 
organizations. For Mitrany, organizations appear to be simply tools 
acting precisely and accurately at the command of their creators. Fur- 
ther, subsequent analyses of functionalist theories have implicitly 
assumed that all international governmental organizations are essen- 
tially alike. There is little perception that organizations differ 
either across time or from one another, in performance, or in the effec- 
tiveness or efficiency with which they achieve their ends. Nor is there 
any perception that organizations differ in what they are trying to 
achieve. This is especially evident in the quantitative cross-national 
tests of functionalist theory (Wallace and Singer 1970, Jacobson 1986). 
These have usually simply used the number of international organizations 
(in a given year, or to which a country belongs) as an indicator of 
enmeshment. Thus the International Postal Union becomes the equivalent 
of the UN, NATO, or the EEC. Organizations that have high reputations 
for effective action, like UNICEF or some of the more effective non- 
governmental organizations, are the equivalent of those that are near 
mot ibund . 
Finally, I0 functionalism appears to assume that all organizations 
are alike in their positive contribution to enmeshment and thus to a 
more stable and peaceful international system. At least two different 
counter propositions can be raised here. First, it would be quite logi- 
cal to derive from functionalism propositions about variance in 
organizational performance. If international organizations increase 
both enmeshment and value change, it could be proposed that those 
organizations that are more effective in achieving their assigned ends 
have a stronger positive impact on enmeshment and value changes than do 
those with lower levels of performance. Second, it is possible that 
organizations differ radically in the extent to which they aim, or inad- 
vertently work, toward promoting stability, peace, or integration in the 
international system. Some organizations may in fact promote conflict 
and disintegration in the system, and for these, variance in performance 
might be negatively associated with international integration. To 
pursue questions of this character, however, it is necessary to approach 
international organizations with somewhat more specialized and powerful 
conceptual tools. These are concerned especially with the issue of 
organizational performance, but before we move to those tools we must 
say a word about another related development. 
Regimes and Organizational Theory 
One of the important recent developments in international relations 
is the observation of increasing interdependence. This leads, by not 
terribly clearly articulated or tested logic, to the proposition that 
international relations are coming to be, or are in part, governed by 
norms or principals that, 'like the rules of societal institutions or 
social structures, have a fundamentally moral character. They are not 
simply coldly calculated or rational contractual agreements. Rather 
they are norms, rules that are value-ladened and induce among actors an 
obligation to comply. International relations are governed in part by 
moral norms or principals, called regimes (Keohane and Nye 1972, 1977, 
and Krasner, 1983). 
From a sociological perspective this is a familiar observation. It 
is similar to Durkheim's discovery, or argument, that any contractual 
arrangement depends upon an underlying set of non-contractual norms 
that alone permit contracts to be made. These are the "facts" that are 
sui generis social facts. They represent an underlying collective con- 
science, a set of ideas of what is right and good that is broadly shared 
by the members of a "society". Durkheirn (1893 and 1966) made the point 
of the underlying normative system, and many others have elaborated it 
(Fisher and Strauss 1978). Society is a moral order. Its rules induce 
an obligation to comply, and deviance, always implied by the very con- 
cept of a rule, induces a sense of moral outrage. The idea of regimes 
simply extends this intranational, or societal, concept to the inter- 
national arena . 
There is, of course, considerable vagueness, or imprecision 
(Strange, 1983), in the concept. For the initiators, and their fol- 
lowers, the central point is agreement on a set of value-ladened rules, 
or norms and principals. From that point, there is much avoidance of 
specification of parameters, content, or dimensions of variance. When 
one begins to consider where such agreements or regimes come from, Young 
(1983) can observe that they can arise spontaneously; they can be 
negotiated into being; or they can be imposed by a superior national 
government, a hegemon in the rhetoric of international relations.11 
Young even goes so far as to suggest that there is a lower incidence of 
negotiated regimes in international than in domestic society (1983, 
p 103) and that the incidence will be related to the centralization of 
authority and power in society. This implies that regimes can readily 
be identified and distinguished from one another so that they can be 
. Suggesting that regimes can be imposed raises questions about 
the "obligation" to comply, which is part of Krasner's definition. 
Young does not deal with this issue, but it may constitute a point at 
which his use of the concept is at considerably divergent from that of 
the originators. 
counted. Few sociologists would be so bold in thinking about institu- 
tions or social structures at the societal level, and one might well 
question whether greater precision can be expected at the international 
or intersocietal level. 
Whether the concept of regimes will prove more fruitful, or, as 
Strange 'proposes, it is merely a fad, and a pernicious one at that, the 
question arise of the place of international organizations in the con- 
cept of regimes. Again, from a sociological perspective we can make a 
few suggestions. Two causal directions, and a persistent view of 
dynamics rather than statics can be proposed. From one direction, if 
regimes represent underlying normative structures, they may constitute 
different arenas in which international organizations can be readily 
created. Regimes permit the creation of international organizations. 
Regime strength, scope and permanence would then predict the creation, 
perseverance, and even the effectiveness of international organizations. -. . . .. - 
Further, a perhaps more important, as regimes strengthen, more, and more 
effective international organizations should be found emerging from 
them. Or as regimes weaken and the agreement erodes, the international 
organizations that depend and rest upon them will also weaken and show 
lower levels of survival and effectiveness. 
From a different direction, similar to the I0 Functionalist posi- 
tion, international organizations will promote the emergence of regimes. 
Here international organizations create regimes. We shall later argue 
that the UNFPA helped to create agreement in the international community 
on the importance and possibility of considering population as a 
programmable variable in national and international settings. Further, 
the greater the incidence and persistence of international organiza- 
tions, the greater stronger and broader will be regimes. The two direc- 
tions need not be mutually exclusive, of course, but in each the 
proposition holds that there is a dynamic relation between regime 
characteristics and both the formation and performance of international 
organizations. Stronger regimes should be associated with greater 
incidence and effective of international organizations; or more effec- 
tive international organizations will build stronger regimes, and the 
causal directions can flow both ways. 
Our view at this point is that the concept of regime might be a 
useful sensitizing concept, leading us to ask how much of what kind of 
underlying international agreement exists, and how this affects the per-. 
formance of international organizations. At the same time, we are not 
very hopeful for the development of clear, independent, operational 
definitions of that agreement so that it can become a concept used for 
prediction. It is more likely to emerge as a post hoc explanatory con- 
dition rather that a variable from which one can make predictive 
propositions. In any event, regimes, too, lead us to think about the 
performance' of international organizations, and that is a topic on which 
the sociology of organizations might prove useful. 
Some of the major advances in organizational sociology have come 
through two strategic developments. One is a focus on organizational 
performance -- effectiveness or efficiency. This has provided the field 
with a dependent variable, giving rise to the second major development: 
the recognition of an interrelated set of conditions that affect per- 
formance. Organizational environments, technology, structure, and goals 
have been found to interact to affect the character and performance of 
organizations. Attempts have been made to treat these conditions as 
variables, but it would be better to see them as sensitizing concepts. 
As Scott (1987) has shown all of these concepts have provided important 
insights, but all have also been found to have many dimensions of 
variance. They are not easy to operationalize, and ultimately, they are 
rather difficult to pin down as real variables. In any event, we shall 
examine each of these conditions which we feel can enhance our under- 
standing of international organizations. Throughout, we shall draw on 
the experience of the UNFPA and FAO, working respectively in the fields 
of population and forestry, to put some meat on the analytical bones.12 
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 
The shift from closed to open systems in organizational sociology 
marked the important recognition that environments vary and can have a 
12. This somewhat unusual selection of examples comes simply from 
the fact that it was our work on these organizations that led us to per- 
ceive the great gap between organizational and international organiza- 
tion studies. 
decisive impact on organizational behavior and performance (Aldrich 
1979). Environmental forces shape goals, boundaries, and the internal 
activity of organizations. Conceptually, environments are found to vary 
in homogeneity, stability, complexity and turbulence, all with substan- 
tial impact of character and behavior. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), for 
example, showed how environmental variance determined which structure 
would be most effective for an organization. This was a major step, 
among many, in the development of what is (perhaps presumptuously) 
called contingency theory. Contrary to the arguments of the classicists 
like Bernard, this argues that there is no one best way to organize any- 
thing; the best structure and process is contingent upon such things as 
the environment and the technology. All of this has led to a rich con- 
ceptual development and a research enterprise that goes very much unused 
in the field of international organizations, and for its side has been 
blind to international organizations and their distinctive environments. 
Environments &I International Organizational Analysis 
Although international organization analysts have made little use 
of sociological work on environments, there are at least two develop- 
ments that are noteworthy. In their work on influence in international 
governmental organizationsl3, Cox and Jacobson (1974) provided one 
example of the political scientists' examination of environments. 
First, they make a distinction between the general and specific environ- 
ments (which is not unlike the distinction between environments, and 
task environments in organizational theory). General environments are 
those that affect all international organizations, specific environments 
affect only some, depending on the issue. Further, they "...conceive 
the general environment in terms of states, their characteristics and 
broad policies." Only states can become members of international 
organizations, and "...states are the principal units in world politics 
and the dominant mode for organizing human and physical resources." (p 
27) The general environment exhibits three dimensions of variance: the 
13. It should be noted that this work, which provides a conceptual 
framework together with case studies on influence in international 
organizations focuses purely on international governmental organiza- 
tions, though this distinction between I0 and IGO is not made explicit. 
stratification of power, economic and political characteristics (which 
are really two dimensions), and the political alignment of states. Cox 
and Jacobson recognize that this focus 'on states has some limitations, 
since it excludes transnational corporations, religious groups, or other 
"emerging forms of behavior and value".14 
Two points must be made about this conception of the environment. 
First, the limited focus on states marks the implicitly non-Marxian 
character of this perspective. The neo-Marxian World Systems perspec- 
tive, for example, would argue that it is the capitalist system that 
provides the dominant mode of organizing human and physical resources, 
and that this system requires a world comprised of a large number of 
relatively small states precisely to give the capitalist system freedom 
to exercise its own internal logic of economic calculation for capital 
expansion. Second, even for a non-Marxian perspective, it seems both 
unnecessary and conceptually costly to exclude the other transnational 
phenomena that Cox and Jacobson recognize could be conceived as part of 
the environment. We believe they are led to this unnecessary limitation 
by developing a conceptual framework that is basically descriptive 
rather than analytical. If the environment were conceived to include a 
variety of organizational units, which vary in homogeneity, complexity, 
stability, and turbulence, it could readily accommodate the great 
variety of transnational phenomena that have a substantial impact on the 
character and behavior of international organizations (governmental, 
non-governmental, and business). This is, of course, only a suggestion 
and does not provide a full development of a research agenda. It does, 
however, question the limited conceptualization of this one important 
treatment of environments in the field of international organizations. 
Aside from this specific treatment of the impact of environments on 
influence, work on international organizations has generally neglected 
this world of external conditions. The more common treatment is that 
found in Jacobson's more general work, International Organizations: Net- 
works of Interdependence (1984) Here the environment is treated as a --
14. , 'In a subsequent paper we shall use this as a point. of departure 
to examine the relation between social movements and international 
organizations. 
collection of sovereign states, which limits the autonomy of inter- 
national organizations. (p 77, our emphasis) They are creatures of 
sovereign states, have no powers of taxation, and rely in sovereign 
states both for their resources and for rights of access to their ter- 
ritories. Little else follows to bring the'complexity and variance of 
the environment deliberately into focus as a determinant of the charac- 
ter and behavior of international organizations. 
The International Environment Organizational Autonomy -
We believe it would be more fruitful to include this complexity in 
part because it accords better with the world of international 
governmental organizations, and also because it can provide for the 
development of interesting propositions from the functionalist perspec- 
tive that this work portrays. First, although international governmen- 
tal organizations indeed lack autonomy in one sense, there are also 
important ways that they use the sovereignty of states to increase their 
autonomy. IGO secretariats spend great amounts of time and energy in 
the diplomacy of conferences, establishing agendas, coopting member 
state representatives (buying votes), developing technical data for 
L 
specific organizational purposes and generating consensual resolutions. 
These provide legitimation for the demands or interests of the IGO as 
they search for external resources. One could not really understand 
this elaborate ritual of conference diplomacy without seeing it as a 
mechanism by which IGOs use state sovereignty to increase their 
autonomy. Further, IGOs can use the differences between sovereign mem- 
bers to increase their own autonomy. For example, if the governing body 
of a Specialized Agency presses for a change of policy or tactics, the 
agency can respond that it is carrying out the legitimate demands of the 
sovereign nations states it is serving. 
If IGOs can gain, as well as lose, autonomy through the sovereign 
state character of the environment, it is possible that under certain 
conditions, they might actually resist the greater integration of the 
international system. Weiss (1975) makes this point generally, and 
sewell (1966) has shown how organizational constraints in the World Bank 
have obstructed supranational cooperation. A more integrated and 
politically centralized world system would provide stronger supra- 
organizational direction over the IGOs, which would limit certain types 
of autonomy, especially where unit heads use the resources of the 
organization for their own advancement or amusement. From this . 
perspective, IGOs could be expected to obstruct greater world integra- 
tion. The United Nations system has more than once attempted to reor- 
ganize itself to bring greater capacity to control its own units. It is 
also clear that the units themselves have often resisted such reor- 
ganization, precisely because the heads of specialized and other agen- 
cies would thereby loose some control over their own organizations. The 
inability of the UN system to control special agency directors is well 
recognized. The extreme case of M'Bow's leadership of UNESCO is only 
that, an extreme case. It is by no means unique. Common observations 
of the "feudal" character of the UN system of organizations contain as 
much accuracy as hyperbole. 
The point here is not to criticize the UN system, but to point out 
that the organizations of the UN system are by no means the simple, 
easily directed tools of action that Functionalists implicitly assume 
them to be. They are human collectivities that serve the personal 
interests of their members as well as the general ends of their man- 
dators. How the balance is struck between these sets of interests 
depends for the most part on the larger political-economic environment, 
the structure controlling the organization itself, and on other internal 
characteristics, such as leadership. The point is that environment, 
governing structure, and leadership vary, and under certain conditions 
can be expected to lead organizations to work against, as well as for, 
the integration of the larger international system. Thus unless we know 
more about the organic link between organizational activity and the 
larger system integration, we cannot assume that the mere creation of 
more international organizations, or the mere fact of state membership 
in such organizations reflects greater system integration. At the very 
least, this establishes a rich and complex research agenda for 
Functionalist theory. 
The International Environment: Three Dimensions of Variance -
There are other dimensions of variance in the international scene 
that should be identified. Here we can suggest three more dimensions, 
whose systematic analysis might advance both organizational and inter- 
national organizational analysis. These concern boundary permeability, 
claimed and actual areas of state control, and the existence of an over- 
arching, international legal and normative system. Boundary permeability 
refers to the quantity and quality of boundary openness. States like 
modern Burma have relatively closed boundaries; most Western European 
states, or Canada and the US, show more open boundaries. The degree of 
boundary permeability, or openness, varies both across countries and 
over time. It also varies on a qualitative dimension as well. Burma can 
restrict the flow of certain persons and organizations, but it also 
experiences a substantial pattern of smuggling15 of a limited range of 
consumer goods, from cloth and flashlights to contraceptives. Thus 
multinational corporations find it difficult to enter Burma to establish 
their own operations, but Burmese find it possible to obtain a range of 
consumer goods that their own economy cannot produce in sufficient quan- 
tities. Jacobson (1984) has shown that there is greater integration in 
the EEC than in other regional groupings. From this one could propose a 
general relationship between boundary openness and the amount of 
integration achieved by IGOs, and the causal links should not be assumed 
to be simple or unilinear. 
State sovereignty also varies considerably in the type and number 
of internal activities over which the state claims legitimate and 
exclusive control. The classic distinction here is between totalitarian 
and non-totalitarian states, but the full range of differences is 
scarcely captured by this simple dichotomy. Internal controls over 
markets, .information flows, private associations, and the means of 
violence are only a few of the areas in which state-claimed control 
varies. And there are very dramatic differences in the capacity of 
states to exercise claimed control. All claim the exclusive right to 
control the means of violence, but some states are obviously more 
15. Smuggling, of course, is not a simple objective condition. It 
varies with state taxation and marketing control schemes. During the 
early 1960s when Indonesia attempted to control the marketing of rubber 
through its state apparatus, providing less than world prices for the 
product, much of the rubber was smuggled out of Indonesia into Sin- 
gapore, whose boundary policy defined this as merely open trade. 
capable of exercising this control than are others, and the same is true 
for almost all areas in which claims are made. Again, one can derive a 
proposition from this observation. The scope of a state's control may 
be related to the degree of integration signalled by IGO membership or 
activity. Whether that relationship is linear or curvilinear can be 
left as an empirical question. 
The final dimension of variance to be considered here is the exist- 
ence of an effective overarching legal and normative system. Here the 
critical distinction is between international and domestic environments. 
That is, organizations dealing in a domestic environment can deal 
directly with private individuals or groups, constrained and assisted by 
the general legal and normative rules that govern the population. An 
organization can provide services or mobilize resources from private 
individuals and groups, and can also sue and be sued by its clients or 
the population it affects. The international environment contains only 
- - .. 
a weak overarching set of either legal or cultural controls.16 Multi- 
- - - 
national corporations can find their assets or facilities nationalized, 
and they may have little recourse to any super-state law for compensa- 
tion. Individuals may find themselves incarcerated or fined, without the 
protection of international law." Governments or people may also find 
themselves invaded, and their territorial integrity violated, without 
any recourse to international law. Haile Selassie's Ethiopia and modern 
Afghanistan or Nicaragua present only some of the more obvious cases. 
- -- 
These observations, of course, identify one of the major aims of inter- 
national government organizations, the creation of a world legal or 
normative system. It is here that we can place the central 
Functionalist proposition that IGO membership and activity lead to a 
more extensive and powerful international legal and normative system. 
If we note that different forms of organization are differentially 
Is. International private law provides some possibility of law 
suits, but these depend on specific treaty agreements, which make the 
environment something less than homogeneous. 
. Both organizations and individuals have some recourse to 
assistance, of course, but.it is more often to the power of the parent 
state and to bilateral diplomacy that organizations and individuals turn 
for redress of wrongs in the international arena. 
affected by boundary permeability, or by claimed and actual areas of 
state control, we are led to some important perceptions about environ- 
ments that organizational sociology neglects.18 Environments are not 
simply objective facts whose conditions are independent of organization. 
They are, on the contrary, partly defined by the organization itself. 
Thus since IGOs are formed specifically by agreement between two or 
more governments, governments form a dominant portion of the environ- 
ment. 10s must deal through governments and often have difficulty in 
dealing directly with the citizens of member states. Citizens or 
organizations in states that are not members to the agreement are in a 
real sense off-limits, outside the purview of action, or not a part of . 
the environment of IGOs. Today some of the most successful population 
and agricultural programs to be found in the Third World are in Taiwan. 
Since 1972, however, the United Nations has been unable to participate 
in these programs, and for some activities it cannot even recognize that 
they exist.19 Before 1972, of course, the UN and its agencies could not 
deal with mainland China, thus eliminating about a fifth of the world's 
population from its activities. 
International nongovernmental organizations, either non-market or 
market, have far greater capacity to deal with all governments, and even 
capacities to by-pass governments in dealing directly with individuals 
or groups in a host country. Thus the "environment" is in a very real 
sense defined by the organization itself. If we are to build effective 
taxonomies of environments, then, this must take into account the 
organization whose environment is being examined. 
TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Organizations Technolosy 
18. Perrow (1986 pp 173-1761 notes that much attention has been 
given to the environmental impacts on organizations, while the reverse 
impact has been largely neglected. Especially if one takes seriously 
the fact that organizations generate power for their controllers, it is 
easy to see that powerful organizations control their environments, 
precisely to make them stable and supportive. 
19. This is especially evident in the publications of the World 
Bank tables, but can be seen in most UN documents as well. 
An organization's technology lies in the tools and the procedures 
it uses as it works, or goes about attempting to achieve some end. Two 
decades of work on technology in the sociology of organizations has 
produced rich insights, a new conceptual framework, and enduring confu- 
sion and disagreement (Scott 1987). 
The character of an organization lies to a great extent in what 
James Thompson (1967) calls its technical core. Given the importance 
of this organizational element to their operations, organizations typi- 
cally seek to buffer their technical core against the demands of the 
environment through a host of structural arrangements and administrative 
strategies. His work and that of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) called 
attention both to the variance of technology, and the impact it has on 
organizational structure. The result was contingency theory, a new con- 
ceptual framework that argues there is no one best way to design an 
organization.ZO Instead, the best way depends upon the specific tech- 
nologies used and the specific environment in which the organization 
finds itself. 
The concept of organizational technology is generally broadly 
defined. It includes not only the machines and other hardware used by 
organizations to achieve their ends, but the skills, knowledge, training 
of mployees, the approaches, strategies and procedures utilized, and 
even the characteristics of the objects (inputs and outputs) on which 
work is performed (Scott, 1987 p 211). Specifically, Scott identifies 
six dimensions of technologies: Inputs, throughputs, outputs, materials, 
operations, and knowledge. The first three comprise what Scott calls 
stage of processing while the latter three are facets of technoloqy 
(Scott, 1987 p. 212). Without going into greater detail in defining 
technology, we can illustrate several aspects of technology that we feel 
demonstrate the value of the concept to the study of international 
organizations. They are: input technologies from the environment, the 
organization's own distinctive core technology, and a previously uniden- 
'O. This can be seen as a theoretical development as significant 
in organizational sociology as the advent of Functionalism was in inter- 
national organizations. In both cases, the shift is from more mechani- 
cal, legalistic, and constitutional approaches to organizations to more 
organic, behavioral and empirical approaches. 
tified type of technology that we shall call monitoring technologies. 
Although typically considered an "internal" organizational element, 
technology overlaps significantly with the environment. Ehployees and 
their skills are garnered from the environment as are inputs such as 
materials, information and so on. Likewise, an organization's end 
products are distributed to elements found within its environment. In 
short, technology links the organization with its environment, creating 
a conduit through which influence, power, and materials are passed. 
Relationships also exist between technology and another organization 
element - structure. As of yet, little work has focused on the 
relationship between technology and organizational performance. 
The effect of technology on structure is well established, at least 
in general outlines. A more complex technology demands a more complex, 
differentiated structure or greater reliance on professionals; a more 
uncertain, less routinizable technology demands a flatter (i.e. less 
hierarchic) organization with more effort given to the coordination of 
relatively independent parts.'l These important insights are not 
without their disagreements and confusion, however. There is disagree- 
ment over the relative impact of technology, structure, and environment 
on one another. And operationalizing the concept of technology for sys- 
tematic measurement has not proved an easy task (see Scott, 1987 p.223- 
232; Perrow, 1986 p. 143-146). 
Still, the concept of varying technology, and the proposition that 
it will be closely related with structure, &nvironment and performance 
provide important insights that have been neglected in the study of 
international organizations. A few examples must suffice here to . 
demonstrate that organizational technology should be on the research 
agenda of.internationa1 organizations. 
Input Technologies 
A major input technology of the UNFPA is the new non-coitally- 
. For summary information on technology and structural 
relationships see Scott, 1987, especially chapter 9; Perrow 1986; clas- 
sic works by Woodward, 1965, Thompson, 1967, and Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; see also Perrow, 1970; Rackham and Woodward, 1970; and Pugh et 
al. 1969. 
specific contraceptive technology. It was produced in the general 
environment less than a decade before the Fund was established. Without 
this new technology, the task of the Fund would be far different than 
what it has turned out to be. It might even be reasonable to propose 
that without this input technology, there would have been no UNFPA. In 
effect the development of this technology gave established governments 
and international organizations something they could actually do to 
affect population growth rates. 
In this, the technology was similar to that used previously by 
national and international health'organizations to reduce mortality. 
Vaccines, insecticides, anti-biotic drugs, IUDs, oral contraceptive 
pills, and surgical sterilization share the property of being 
bureaucratically portable. They need to be "distributed" to users, 
whose acceptance does not necessarily require their active participation 
in new, long-linked, complex patterns of behavior. Without such tech- 
nologies, reducing mortality or fertility would require changing values 
and patterns of daily behavior that have proved to be difficult for 
government bureaucracies to affect. Here, then, is an input technology 
that not only affects the performance, but possibly also the very exist- 
ence of an international governmental organization. 
Core Technology 
To explain the autonomy of the World Bank and some of its internal 
units, Ascher (1983) uses March and Simon's approach to uncertainty 
management and provide some understanding of how the Bank works. We 
believe that Crane and Finkle (1981) gives us a more critical under- 
standing, however, from the use of the technology concept." They point 
out that despite MacNamarrals strong public statements and personal com- 
mitment, he was unable to move the Bank to work effectively in the field 
of population. Crane and Finkle argue that it was the Bank's core tech- 
nology that was at fault. That technology is effectively one of cal- 
. There is a more powerful contrast to be made between Jonsson's 
(1986) use of interorganizational analysis to examine the IATA involve- 
ment in the air fare issues and Perrow's (1984, chapters 5,6) use of 
technology to contrast air and maritime safety and accident records, but 
that would take us further afield than we wish to go now from our sub- 
stantive focus on population and social forestry. 
culating investment returns & project activities. For the construction 
of the physical infrastructure needed for development, this technology 
may work quite ~ e l l . ~ V t  does not work well, however, for investments 
in social services. In effect, the Bank's core technology made it 
ignorant of how to invest in population activities. In another areas, 
however, we can show how that same technology gave the Bank greater 
flexibility to move into new activities in forestry. 
As noted earlier, technology resides not only in the physical tools 
of an organization, but also in work procedures, and perhaps more impor- 
tantly in the training and background of its staff. This may make tech- 
nology as much a political as a technical issue. The impact of the 
political dimensions of technology on organizational behavior can be 
readily illustrated in international work in forestry. 
In the world of international forestry, the past decade has seen a 
dramatic shift from "industrial" to "social" forestry. Rapid growth and 
the expansion of agriculture in the Third World has destroyed most of 
the wood supply in many world regions. It is estimated that more than 2 
billion people in 100 countries are in desperate need of forests for 
fuel, fodder, and for ground cover to protect against erosion.14 
Industrial forestry, concerned with producing trees for industry, is not 
geared to addressing the problems of rural populations and their basic 
needs. Social forestry has emerged to fill this gap and has become an 
important strategy for reforestation of rural areas to meet basic human 
needs. 
What is most interesting here is the different extent of the move- 
ment found in different international organizations. Thus UN's Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) Forestry Division has shown the least 
. The Bank has made a significant movement toward another form 
of core technology in recent years in the greater use of Sectoral Lend- 
ing. This move appears to be dictated in part by political considera- 
tions'as well as economic ones, and it presents the Bank with some 
extremely difficult technical problems. The technology of investment 
return calculations for sectors are by no means as well developed as 
they are for projects, if indeed there exists such a technology at all. 
For a general overview of international environmental problems 
see Erik Echolm, 1982. 
movement.25 The World Bank has shown more significant movement, with 
recent programs and loans for social forestry projects. The INGO, 
Cooperative American Relief Everywhere (CARE), has moved most rapidly 
with over ten years of actual field project experience in this area. 
The explanation for this variance is best found in the impact of tech- 
nology. FAO's forestry unit is staffed by highly professional 
foresters, whose training and professional orientation are directed to 
industrial forestry. The Division's origins lie in the very important 
work it did arranging for the trade in European lumber (from East to 
West) that was used in the reconstruction of Western Europe after the 
war. Thus there are both the historical experiences and staff back- 
grounds that give this organization a dominant character shaped largely 
by its technology. Industrial forestry is an FA0 core technology that 
has been infused with value, and thus severely obstructs the shift to 
social forestry. 
As a profession, forestry is essentially industrial forestry. 
Professional foresters tend to view themselves as a special breed who 
are generally misunderstood by society, where there is felt to be little 
understanding of the important role trees play in creating and maintain- 
ing a modern lifestyle. Without trees, the foresters say, there would 
be no houses, paper, chemicals, and other essential products. It is 
therefore of greatest importance to produce trees as efficiently as pos- 
sible. Social forestry, with its concern for satisfying basic human 
needs (such as firewood) in small communities, tends to be viewed by 
many foresters as an unfortunate diversion, drawing attention and 
resources from the serious business of the efficient production of tim- 
ber and other industrial wood products essential for modern life. 
If the World Bank's core technology prohibited it from active 
involvement in population planning, that same technology had quite dif- 
ferent implications for forestry projects. The capacity to estimate 
investment returns makes all manner of forestry projects simple tools 
rather than ends in themselves. If social forestry projects can be 
25. This is the area of a doctoral dissertation currently underway 
by Steven Brechin. The statements here can be taken in the nature of 
working hypotheses that are being tested. 
shown to have greater benefit to cost ratios, they command resources. 
Further, as the World Bank made a policy decision to focus more on rural 
development and basic human needs, the calculative technology could 
search for specific activities that would achieve those ends. Projects 
could be generated with requests for staff tailored to the task, rather 
than the task being tailored to the existing staff (see also Finkle and 
Crane, 1981 p.518) 
CARE's core technology in this area may be said to lie in community 
development programing and emergency relief. The staff'have developed 
high technical capacities to determine what activities will actually 
contribute to local living standards, and also to determine the 
feasibility of such projects. Projects can therefore be designed to 
meet local needs, drawing the specific resources -- expert staff and 
specialized materials -- needed for that project. That is, resources 
can be tailored to the task rather than having the task tailored to the 
- .. 
resources. Sensing the value of social forestry for rural community 
development, CARE's technology facilitated the induction of social 
forestry as part of CARE's repertoire of development programs. 
Technology International Integration: The Role of Monitoring 
If technology is an important determinant of organizational action 
and should be placed on the research agenda in international organiza- 
tions, one of the central questions here can be the relation between 
technology and international conflict or integration. For example, we 
can suggest that the new contraceptive technology that made a major part 
of UNFPA's work actually possible, generated both conflict and consensus 
or integration. Coinciding with UNFPA1s birth was The Papal Encyclical, 
Hummanae Vitae, which reiterated the Roman Catholic Church's proscrip- 
tion of "artificial" contraception. Further, the perfection of a simple 
and safe method for abortion has also thrust the UNFPA into the center 
of new and very costly controversies. Here the impact seems to be in 
the direction of conflict that negates or reverses international 
integration. On the other hand, perhaps the greatest achievement of the 
UNFPA has been the generation of a world consensus around the 
problematic character of population dynamics, especially rapid growth, 
and the need for rational and humane planning to shape those dynamics 
(Ness, 1986). The depth of this consensus, and the speed with which it 
has been generated is truly remarkable, especially give the long history 
of government policies in population, which have been essentially 
pronatalist and pro-growth. 
In part, the success of the UNFPA in generating this consensus 
rests on another aspect of the technology available to it: social 
demography. This is essentially a monitoring technology, which can dis- 
play the character of the social and economic conditions of the popula- 
tion, project estimates for the future, and monitor the impact of major 
social programs on those conditions. This technology has been develop- 
ing, both in its material and organizational sense for the better part 
of the past two centuries, and now can be said to represent one of the 
most powerful research technologies available in the social sciences. 
The impact of this technology on policy decisions in population planning 
has been deep and extensive." It may not be an exaggeration to propose 
that this technology has been the single most important force in drawing 
the world community toward consensus in the area of population plan- 
ning. a 
The monitoring technology for environmental protection, on the 
other hand, is not so well developed, and places the UNEP, for example, 
in a less powerful position for generating consensus than was the UNFPA. 
The monitoring technology for "environmental degradation" is of more 
recent origin, it is more complex, and it is far less developed than is 
social demography. The technology is developing rapidly, however, and 
. Ness and Ando (1984) have shown how national population cen- 
suses and socio-economic surveys, especially emerging out of plans for 
national economic development, have been major determinants of policy 
decision making in population planning. 
. See Finkle and Crane (1984) for a good discussion of the 
Mexico City Second International Conference on Population. Our analysis 
here does not propose that the UNFPA is the only organization to have 
led toward greater world consensus on this issue. Indeed, many private 
and public organizations have played important roles over the past three 
decades, and some can trace their activity back almost a century. See 
also Simmons, Ness, and Simmons (1983) for the argument that the 
dominance of social demography has led to a neglect of study of the 
impact of population policies and programs on reproductive modern fer- 
tility transitions. 
it will be important to trace its impact on international integration, 
or on other issues of international organizational behavior. To the 
extent that the technology shows, as it does, that'pollution does not 
respect national boundaries, it can be a force for greater international 
integration. It should not be forgotten, however, that the creation of 
the UNEP involved a storm of economic conflict between the more and less 
developed countries of the world (see Caldwell, 1985). The extent to 
which this conflict is fueled or dampened by the technology of inter- 
national environmental monitoring and management represents at the very 
least an important research question for international organization. 
Finally, we can observe that monitoring technologies serve some of 
the most common activities of the United Nations system in general.26 
It is important, therefore to note that there are differences in these 
technologies that have important implications for the international sys- 
tem. For example, the surveys of social demography require either 
agreement or cooperation of the nation-states members if they are to be 
effective. States undertake their own population censuses, and some- 
times control private organizations that wish to engage in large scale 
sample work. For some states this implies little or no monitoring, 
because the results can be so conflict-producing. This is especially 
the case in mixed ethnic states like Lebanon and Nigeria, whose censuses 
have been retard precisely because of the conflictual political implica- 
tions. For most states, however, it is not difficult to show that more 
accurate demographic information is important to national policy. 
Ultimately this promoted increased international cooperation around 
monitoring. Thus the increase in the numbers of countries that accept 
international standards and both undertake and report censuses can be 
taken as an indirect measure of integration. 
Environmental monitoring, on the other hand, does not require 
nation-state agreement when pollutants are carried by air and water cur- 
rents. Pressures on industrial and nuclear waste productfon can act to 
increase world integration in part because the monitoring technology 
does not require agreement at the source. To the extent that remote 
Jacobson 1984, chapters 8, 11, and 14. 
sensing from satellites is developed as a monitoring technology, it 
enhances this set of pressures. Other forms of environmental monitoring, 
of course, do require on-site inspection, and thus can be come sources 
of sustained conflict. 
This only raises the general issue, of course, it provides no 
answers. The point is that technologies of all sorts have implications 
for organizational action, and for outcomes.of that action in the inter- 
national scene. One of the major forms of technology used by inter- 
national governmental organizations is monitoring technology. This 
varies along many dimensions and will have varying impact on the inter- 
national system. Those complex patterns of covariance should certainly 
be a part of the =esearch agenda in international organizations. 
ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND STRUCTURE -- 
Even more central and of longer duration in organizational analysis 
have been the concepts of goals and structure. Like environment and 
technology, however, these concepts have been both richly insightful, 
and confused and conflictual. Here we can only touch on these concepts 
briefly and suggest some fruitful lines of enquiry. 
Goals -
It is generally agreed that organizations are specifically created 
to achieve some specific ends, or to perform some specific tasks. That 
that end or task should be amenable to systematic observation and 
analysis would seem to follow logically. And so it has. There have 
been a number of classification systems for goals, and these have led to 
some interesting observations of systematic covariance (Perrow, 1961, 
Etzioni 1961 and 1972). Etzioni, for example, proposed a taxonomy of - 
goals based on a tripartite classification of power, thus drawing this 
important concept into the center of organizational analysis. There has 
been little application of the concept in international organizations, 
although Jacobson's (1984) presentation of the networks of integration 
uses a similar classification in discussing security, economic, and wel- 
fare organizations in the system. 
Etzioni's classification is useful for more than simple descrip- 
tion, however. If fact, its real utility lies in the use of the dynamic 
propositions that can be derived from the theory of power. He argues 
that different goals demand different compliance structures, and these 
often make contradictory demands on an organization. We can argue that 
many of the UN agencies must carry two different types of goals, which 
fit the 10 functionalists' prescriptions. They must be concerned with 
delivering a good or service, thus promoting enmeshment, and with chang- 
ing, or creating a new set of values and attitudes. 
In Etzioni's terms, value change is a cultural goal, requiring a 
normative compliance structure. Providing goods and services, on the 
other hand, is an economic goal, requiring a utilitarian compliance 
structure. The two often make contradictory demands, which we have 
argued (Ness 1985) is a source of internal strain in the UNFPA. In 
relatively simple terms, the cultural goal requires a high degree of 
internal loyalty or commitment to the organization, which gives it 
something of the character of a religious social m~vement.'~ The 
organization needs a staff of believers. To provide goods and services, 
however, efficiency and effectiveness are required, demanding some tech- 
nical expertise, and attention to rewards for performance. UN agencies 
may especially find these demands contradictory. For example generating 
a policy consensus may require soliciting support among member state 
delegates, which not infrequently carries the price of appointing 
politically influential people to positions, or some other form of 
"vote-buying". Thus people and projects may be selected for their 
political utility to the policy or value change, which may be quite dif- 
ferent more limited technical utility of moving goods and services to 
the points of greatest need. The observation of this conflict appears 
to have been at the base of Mitrany's preference for "technical" 
projects and organizations, and his distaste or revulsion for politics. 
Again, the point is not to criticize UN agencies, but to suggest 
29. It is interesting to note that both the UNFPA, and the US AIDV.s 
Population Office were described as having something of an internal 
religious character, showing a high degree of internal morale and com- 
mitment, especially during their formative years. These were years when 
the organizations had to fight to bring population into the arena of 
public policy and planning. The same almost religious zeal may be said 
to have characterized many of the UN's Specialized Agencies, and even 
the UN Secretariat itself, during the early years. 
the utility of goal analysis in international organizations, and espe- 
cially to be alert to the potentials for conflict in organizations that 
may have to carry more than one type of goal. Thus there are empirical 
questions about the performance of international organizations that can 
be solved only by careful examination of what they are charged to do, 
and the extent to which their charges impose upon them conflicting 
organizational demands. This, too, identifies a larger research agenda 
for international organizations. 
Structure 
One of the major advances over Weber's ideal typical construction 
of the bureaucracy is to note that "rationally" constructed organiza- 
tions may be tall and hierarchic, or flat and ~ollegial.~~ The con- 
tribution of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) is to identify these two major 
types of structure and to show that they are related to both technologi- 
cal and environmental considerations. They showed that a flat 
organizational structure produces higher performance when it operates 
with a new, changing, and not readily routinizable technology, in an 
environment that is unstable and rapidly changing. Where the environ- 
ment is homogeneous and stable, and the technology well known, however, 
a tall, Weberian-type bureaucracy tall or hierarchic structure tends to 
provide the higher performance. 
These observations raise questions about the structure of inter- 
national organizations in relation to both the environment in which they 
must operate, the type of technology they use, and the aims they espouse 
or have thrust upon them. UN agencies themselves can be found to vary 
along the tall to flat dimension, with UNICEF reputably more profes- 
sional, flat, and decentralized. On the other hand, the overall UN 
structure tends to impose a tall hierarchic structure on its organiza- 
' O .  We can observe this variance even in the military, an often- 
used example of the hierarchic organization. "Rationality" may sometimes 
require small, flat organizations only loosely controlled by the center. 
Carlson's Raiders in World War 11, or the Green Berets in the Vietnam 
war represent such "rational" adjustments. 'We can also see something of 
this same rational adjustment throughout history, as, for example, when 
the Dutch military decentralized itself greatly to deal with the 
guerilla warfare it faced in the conquest of Java in the early 19th cen- 
tury (Hyma, 1953, Ness and Stahl, 1977). 
tions. It is possible to raise empirical questions about the 
appropriateness of the given structures for the tasks that have to be 
performed and the environment in which the organization must work. 
Again, items are added to the research agenda, which focus directly on 
organizational performance and its relation to structure, technology, 
and environment, 
CONCLUSION: Comparative Analyses of Performance 
That a gap exists between organizational and international 
organizational analyses is clear. Its source may lie in the different 
treatments the two disciplines have given to the issue of organizational 
performance, an issue central to sociology and neglected in inter- 
national organizations. Though the two functionalisms -- from Sociology 
and International Organizations -- bear some resemblances, they are 
quite different on the issue of organizational actions, and especially 
on the issue of performance. .At the-extremes, Sociology takes a cynical 
view of organizations surreptitiously serving the cloaked aims of t h e i r  .- - 
individual masters; International Organizations takes the naive view of 
organizations working inexorably toward the integration of the world 
community. Neither position is tenable. Both disciplines holding these 
views could be made richer by coming closer together. Further, sociol- 
ogy can gain much from a consideration of the mass of international 
organizations that it has so studiously neglected. International 
organizations can gain greatly from a consideration of the issue of per- 
formance, which it has neglected with equal diligence. 
One of the major arenas for research on the performance of inter- 
national organizations presents itself from the natural development of 
international organizations. Consider, for example, the three major 
substantive areas Jacobson uses to examine the networks of interdepend- 
ence: security, economic development, and social welfare and human jus- 
tice. In all three arenas we find a plethora of IGOs, INGOs, and BINGOS 
as well as those hybrids (like the CIA, and USAID), national governmen- 
tal organizations that operate in a distinctly, though not exclusively, 
international environment. This should provide a rich opportunity for 
comparative analyses of organizational performance. 
And so it has, though only in a limited but very prescient 
exploratory analysis. Kay and Jacobson (1983) have examined the role 
and performance of international organizations in environmental protec- 
tion. They have provided us with a useful taxonomy of functions to be 
performed, of criteria for the analysis of comparative organizational 
effectiveness, and some good ideas about the determinants of 
organizational effectiveness. They recognize that the taxonomy needs 
further development, that the data problems are intractable, and that 
the strategy requires further work. Their work, however, provides an 
extremely useful base from which to build further studies. It 
represents a foundation on which a cumulative scientific development can 
be built. One promising strategy would be to increase the potential for 
generalization by increasing the range of issues or technical problems 
that is addressed in systematically comparative analysis. 
For example, UN, private foundations and welfare organizations, a 
host of bilateral aid agencies, and many multinational multinational 
business organizations profess general goals of agricultural development 
and fertility control. The organizations involved are clearly dif- 
ferent, have far different constraints, have dif f erent structures and 
procedures, and use different technologies, though they all draw on a 
large common stock of readily available agricultural and contraceptive 
technologies. It is probably a correct guess that all of these 
organizations have worked effectively, some way, at some time, under -- 
some conditions, to promote the ends of increased agricultural yields or -
human fertility reduction. Identifying those ways, times, and condi- 
tions for either problem would provide for a greater understanding of 
organizational performance in the international environment, thus adding 
greatly to the Sociology of Organizations. It would also tell us a 
great deal about the role international organizations of all sorts play 
in the growing networks of international interdependence. To perform 
this type of comparative analysis in parallel fashion for or more 
technical or issue areas at the same time would greatly increase the 
generalizability of the findings to a wider range of international or 
organizational issues. 
This strategy of parallel comparative analysis in different issue 
areas could prove as useful in areas of security, all sectors of 
economic development, population, education, welfare, refugee assist- 
ance, and human rights. The rough similarity of goals, or at least of 
stated goals, the fact that any goal implies a variety of sub- 
activities, and the fact that all organizations can usually draw on a 
common stock of technology (including professional personnel), provides 
an excellent opportunity to assess performance in a reasonable man- 
ner. To suggest possible formulations, let us close with two rough 
propositions about the relative performance of IGOs (especially UN Agen- 
cies) and INGOs. 
Goal and Structure Conflicts & International Organizations --
First, both IGOs and INGOs typically face two types of activities 
in reaching their general goals: one concerns developing some consensus 
within the world community for the activity in question. The other con- 
cerns the delivery of technical assistance for that activity. In the 
early days of the UN concern with development, industrialization was 
seen by many to be the key to economic development. Development plans 
and technical assistance gave great emphasis to steel mills and heavy 
industrialization, leading to the neglect of agricultural development. 
Population growth was virtually ignored until the round of Asian 
national censuses in 1960/1 (Ness and Ando 1984, chapter 2). Thus for 
all international agricultural and population organizations, one impor- 
tant early task was to raise awareness agriculture and population, or to 
convince the world community, or its individual member states, of the 
importance of both agriculture and population for general economic and 
social development. Along with this came the task of providing the 
technical assistance needed to achieve what is now known as the Green 
Revolution and rapid fertility decline. From these illustration, we can 
propose two specific hypotheses 
a. IGOs have.been more effective than INGOs in generating world com- 
munity consensus around development and welfare issues, and it is 
the legitimacy of international representation that largely 
accounts for their greater success. 
b. INGOs (and possibly some of the hybrids) have been more effective 
than IGOs in performing the tasks of technical assistance for 
development and welfare aims. This may be because.their environ- 
mental constraints permitted, or induced, them to pay more atten- 
tion to professional than to political or geographic considera- 
tions in personnel and project selection 
It is important to remember that these are hypotheses to be tested, 
not findings to be accepted. They are based on superficial descriptions 
of a few cases. Although we have reason to believe that they are sound, 
it is quite possible that on closer investigation we would conclude that 
the IGOs alone have produced the progress, or that they have been com- 
pletely ineffective in promoting any form of popular welfare or develop- 
ment. The latter might be in accord with current popular American 
assessments of the United Nations organizations, but would run counter 
to classical I0 Functionalist predictions. Whatever the outcome, the 
point is that the issue is an empirical one that demands systematic 
attention to the comparative performance of international organizations. 
Time and Organizational Change --
Second, we can propose that time takes a heavier toll on UN IGO 
performance than it does on INGO performance. This is largely because 
the structure of the United Nations, with its multiple heads, makes it 
difficult to set agreed upon performance standards for its agencies, nor 
can it easily hold them to any standards it does set.al Thus older IGOs 
should be expected to turn inwards with greater concern for staff wel- 
fare than for performance in the client arena. INGOs, on the other 
hand, can have more flexible personnel policies, and admit of greater 
impact of either internal or external leadership. Leadership has a 
greater capacity to set goals and to hold individuals and units respon- 
sible for goal performan~e.~~ Many observers critical of the UN system 
3 1 .  Kay and Jacobson (1983 p 326) point out this structural weak- 
ness in the UN system, which they see as facing an insoluable dilemma. 
Broad geographic representation in staffing is necessary to retain 
world-wide legitimacy and influence, but this makes it difficult to 
reward performance and technical competence. 
. It is interesting to note that Jonsson's successful case of 
the linking pin organization is IATA, an INGO, rather than the UN's own 
International Civil Aviation Organization. Of course, the ICAO is con- 
cerned primarily with safety and standardization, and IATA is concerned 
with fare structures, the issue on which Jonsson found IATA to perform 
so effectively. But this raises an interesting question of why it is 
that an INGO has come to be concerned with fares, while an IGO attends 
to issues of safety and standardization. Tracing the processes by which 
this specific division of labor emerged might tell us a great deal about 
would certainly find this proposition congenial, but there is a far more 
interesting deviant case question to be raised. If this characteriza- 
tion of the UN system is valid, the questions would have to be not, why 
does the UN perform so badly, but why does it perform so well? Anyone 
the least familiar with the UN system can cite individuals and units 
that work exceptionally well. How do we account for this level of per- 
formance in an organization whose structure seems to reward privilege 
rather than performance? We believe that understanding this "deviant 
case process" would take us much further toward movements to increase 
agency performance than would endless tests of the expected case 
process. It would also do a great deal to advance our understanding of 
. both organizations and international organizations. 
the character of the interorganizational network that is emerging in the 
present nation-state world system. 
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